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Abstract 
In Germany, since 2005 needy job-seekers without access to earnings-related and 
insurance-paid “unemployment benefit  I” are entitled to means-tested and tax-
funded “unemployment benefit II”. Several active labour market programmes sup-
port the integration of these needy job-seekers into the labour market. Our paper 
estimates the average effect of targeted wage subsidies – paid to employers for a 
limited period of time - on the subsequent labour market prospects of participating 
needy job-seekers. We apply propensity score matching to compare participants 
with a group of similar non-participants. The results show that wage subsidies had in 
fact large and significant favourable effects: 20 months after taking up a subsidised 
job, the share of persons in regular employment is nearly 40 percentage points 
higher across participants. Estimated effects on the shares not unemployed and the 
share no longer receiving “unemployment benefit II” are slightly smaller. 
Zusammenfassung 
Seit dem Jahr 2005 erhalten erwerbsfähige Hilfebedürftige, die keinen Anspruch auf 
das beitragsfinanzierte Arbeitslosengeld  I haben, das steuerfinanzierte Arbeitslo-
sengeld II. Verschiedene Maßnahmen aktiver Arbeitsmarktpolitik sollen den Über-
gang der erwerbsfähigen Hilfebedürftigen in Beschäftigung unterstützen. Dieser 
Beitrag untersucht die durchschnittliche Wirkung von Eingliederungszuschüssen auf 
die Arbeitsmarktchancen der teilnehmenden erwerbsfähigen Hilfebedürftigen. Mit 
Hilfe von Propensity-Score-Matching wird eine Vergleichsgruppe von ähnlichen 
Nicht-Teilnehmern gebildet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Eingliederungszuschüsse 
die Arbeitsmarktchancen der Geförderten positiv beeinflussen: 20 Monate, nachdem 
erwerbsfähige Hilfebedürftige eine geförderte Beschäftigung aufgenommen haben, 
ist ihr Anteil in regulärer Beschäftigung um ca. 40 Prozentpunkte höher als in der 
Vergleichsgruppe. Die geschätzten Effekte auf die Variablen „nicht arbeitslos“ und 
„kein Arbeitslosengeld-II-Bezug“ fallen etwas geringer aus. 
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1  Introduction 
Due to high and increasing unemployment rates at the beginning of the millennium, 
the German federal government has been initiating fundamental labour market re-
forms: Since 2003 the German Public Employment Service was reorganised, the 
design of several active labour market programmes was modified and new pro-
grammes were introduced. At the beginning of 2005, the former unemployment as-
sistance for long-term unemployed persons and the former social assistance were 
merged into the new “unemployment benefit II” – a means-tested and tax-financed 
basic income support for employable needy job-seekers. Finally, since 2006, the 
duration of earnings-related and insurance-financed “unemployment benefits I” has 
been shortened. 
Several active labour market programmes – established ones as well as newly in-
troduced ones – support the integration of employable needy job-seekers into the 
labour market. Targeted wage subsidies, paid to employers for a limited period of 
time, are one of the programmes that have been established already before the re-
cent reforms. First, they reduce labour costs and can compensate the firm for a 
temporary gap between a worker’s wage and his or her productivity. Second, a pe-
riod of subsidisation might help previous unemployed persons to disclose their pro-
ductivity to an employer and might thus serve as a screening advice. In a recent 
paper, Neumark (2008) concludes that such wage subsidies might be a policy worth 
considering, if one strives to improve economic self-sufficiency via increasing earn-
ings. 
Our paper estimates the effect of these targeted wage subsidies on the subsequent 
labour market prospects of treated needy job-seekers, who receive unemployment 
benefits II. The effectiveness of the instrument in the pre-reform period has been 
investigated by Bernhard et al. (2006) and Jaenichen/Stephan (2007), who found 
rather large positive effects of the subsidy. However, the group of unemployment 
benefit II recipients exists as such only since 2005 and is very heterogeneous 
(Koch/Walwei 2008). In particular, its exit rate into regular work is comparatively low 
(Bach et al. 2008, 6). Thus it is not obvious ex-ante that previous results on the ef-
fectiveness of wage subsidies will be valid for this group also.  
In particular, we ask whether taking up a subsidised job between February and April 
2005 had an impact on the percentage of participants who were a) in unsubsidised 
employment, b) not unemployed and c) not receiving unemployment benefit II during 
the subsequent months. We apply statistical matching techniques and estimate pro-
gramme effects by comparing participants with a group of similar needy job-seekers, 
who did not enter a subsidised job between February and April 2005. In short, our 
results confirm previous positive findings. 
In Section 2 we will sketch the institutional background and characterise the ana-
lysed programme. Furthermore, we will briefly describe international evidence on the 
effectiveness of wage subsidy programmes. Section 3 discusses the evaluation IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  6 
strategy, while Section 4 introduces data and variables as well as the applied 
method. The empirical results are depicted in Section 5. We draw some conclusions 
in Section 6.  
2  Institutional background and literature review 
Institutional background and programme features 
A major part of the social reforms initiated in Germany during the years 2002 and 
2003 involved the system of unemployment compensation. Unemployed persons 
who had contributed to the German unemployment insurance system are eligible for 
unemployment benefits I (Arbeitslosengeld I), which amounts to as much as 67 per-
cent of the latest net income and is paid for a limited period of time. The legal basis 
for the unemployment insurance system is the Social Code III (Sozialgesetzbuch 
III). Traditionally, the German Public Employment Service has been responsible for 
the administration of the unemployment insurance as well as for the job placement 
and programme assignment of registered unemployed persons. 
When unemployment benefits were exhausted, former unemployment benefit recipi-
ents were supported prior to 2005 by means-tested and tax-financed unemployment 
assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), where the amount was also conditional on former 
income. Needy persons without claims for unemployment insurance or unemploy-
ment assistance could apply for means-tested social assistance (Sozialhilfe), which 
was administered by municipalities. Even if capable of work, many of these needy 
persons were not registered as unemployed at the Public Employment Service. 
With the beginning of 2005 the Social Code II (Sozialgesetzbuch II) came into force: 
Former unemployment assistance was abolished. Now needy unemployed job-
seekers and their household members are entitled to means-tested and tax-
financed unemployment benefit II (Arbeitslosengeld II). Its amount does not depend 
on former income. Note that needy job-seekers and their household members are 
predominately registered as unemployed and may receive employment services. 
Since 2005, the administration of the new services for needy job-seekers is mostly 
conducted jointly by the Public Employment Service and by municipalities. An ex-
ception was made for 69 municipalities who opted out of this cooperation and pro-
vide all services for needy job-seekers on their own (Optierende Kommunen). Public 
Employment Services are now organised in two branches: (1) a tax-funded branch - 
based on the Social Code II - for needy employable job-seekers and their house-
holds and (2) an insurance-funded branch - based on the Social Code III - for job-
seekers who receive unemployment benefits I or have not yet qualified for unem-
ployment benefits I. Konle-Seidl (2008) and Stephan/Zickert (2008) discuss aspects 
of the new governance of employment services. 
In Germany, several active labour market programmes support the integration of 
unemployed persons into the labour market. A comprehensive overview on these 
programmes and recent evaluation results can be found in Bernhard et al. (2008). IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  7 
For the period 2000 to 2006, Table 1 shows entries and average numbers of partici-
pants in the most important programmes, which were in 2005 extended to recipients 
of unemployment benefit II respectively introduced in particular for this group. The 
most important programmes covered by Social Code II since 2005 are certainly pub-
lic job creation schemes (Hohmeyer/Wolff 2007) and short-term training (Wolff/Joz-
wiak 2007). Contracting-out placement services to private providers (Bernhard/Wolff 
2008), further vocational training and targeted wage subsidies are less often used, 
but are still important instruments. During the first half of 2005, nearly one percent of 
the average number of needy job-seekers took up a subsidised job (Heinemann et 
al. 2006). Start-up subsidies are granted to unemployment benefit II recipients only 
through a newly installed small-scale programme (Wolff/Nivorozhkin 2008). 
Table 1 
Entries and average numbers in selected labour market programmes during 
2000-2006 (in 1000) 
   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* 2006* 
         II/III II II/III II 
Entries into programme                           
Wage subsidy (Eingliederungszuschüsse) 152 127 188 183 157 134  51  217  97
Further vocational training (Förderung berufl. Weiterbildung) 523 442 455 255 185 132  66  247  103
Public job creation I (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, SAM) 318 246 215 179 161 80  62  80  62
Public job creation II (Arbeitsgelegenheiten) - - - - - 630  630  742  742
Short-term training (Trainingsmaßnahmen) 485 551 865 1064 1188 894  410  978  444
Contracting-out placement services (Beauftragung Dritter)** - - - - 635 426  273  301  148
Average number in programme                      
Wage subsidy (Eingliederungszuschüsse) 105 118 136 153 110 60  21  82  68
Further vocational training (Förderung berufl. Weiterbildung) 343 352 340 260 184 114  18  119  47
Public job creation I (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, SAM) 266 237 193 144 117 61  12  50  7
Public job creation II (Arbeitsgelegenheiten) - - - - - 201  201  293  293
Short-term training (Trainingsmaßnahmen) 52 60 74 93 95 69  34  70  35
Contracting-out placement services (Beauftragung Dritter)** - - - - 95 103  75  100  76
*)  II/III = Programmes covered by Social Code II (without municipalities opting out of the co-operation with the 
Public Employment Service) and Social Code III; II = Programmes covered by Social Code II. 
**) Figures are available since 2004, while different variants started already in 1998 (contracting-out subtasks of 
placement) respectively 2002 (contracting-out all placement services).  
Source: Statistics Department of the German Public Employment Service (Data-Warehouse). 
 
The decision to support an unemployed person with a targeted wage subsidy 
(Eingliederungszuschuss) lays in the discretion of the caseworker, who has – within 
the legal framework and guidelines of the local Employment Agency – also latitude 
in determining the amount and duration of the subsidy. The wage subsidy could at 
the most account for as much as 50 percent of the monthly wage or salary and con-
tinue for at most 12 months. Extensions might be granted for handicapped or older 
workers.  
The employer is obliged to employ subsidised persons who are younger than 50 
years for a follow-up period of further employment after the expiration of the subsidy 
(this period is usually as long as the period of subsidisation itself). If he dismisses 
the worker within this period for reasons not attributable to the worker, the employer 
may be asked to reimburse part of the subsidy. IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  8 
Since the German labour market reforms, targeted wage subsidies has been 
granted for unemployment benefit I recipients covered by Social Code III as well as 
for needy job-seekers – receiving unemployment benefits II – covered by Social 
Code II. Thus, it has been suspected that currently caseworkers for different groups 
of unemployed persons may find themselves in “subsidisation competition” to se-
cure jobs for their clients. This is a problem inherent in the current organisation of 
active labour market policies in Germany. A more integrated approach in supporting 
unemployed persons across the “legal boundaries” of the Social Code II and III 
would surely help to avoid this competition.  
Brief literature review 
For Germany, wage subsidies have been analysed comprehensively as part of the 
so called “Hartz-evaluation” of active labour market programmes (ZEW et al. 2005, 
2006). As part of these studies, Bernhard et al. (2006) and Jaenichen/Stephan 
(2007) estimated average treatment effects of a subsidy on previously unemployed 
individuals, using statistical matching techniques. They showed that taking up a 
subsidised job during the second quarter of 2002 had significant and favourable 
effects on subsequent employment prospects of participants, compared to no or a 
later participation. Jaenichen (2002, 2005) found similar positive results for subsi-
dised unemployed persons in 1999. While the comparison group in the cited studies 
were unsubsidised unemployed persons, Jaenichen/Stephan (2007) conduct also a 
comparison with individuals moving directly out of unemployment into unsubsidised 
employment. The results indicate that differences in the employment prospects be-
tween persons taking-up subsidised and unsubsidised jobs were rather small after 
three years.  
The positive results are in line with the international literature on wage subsidies. 
For Sweden, Sianesi (2008), Carling/Richardson (2004), Fredriksson/Johansson 
(2004) and Forslund et al. (2004) investigated the effects of wage subsidies on the 
labour market prospects of previous unemployed participants. Regardless of the 
method used (statistical matching, event history analysis, instrumental variable dif-
ference-in-difference techniques) the results suggested positive effects of the pro-
grammes. Dorsett (2006) evaluated the British “New Deal” reform for young workers 
and showed that in the longer run the option to claim a wage subsidy dominated all 
other options in preventing unemployment.  
For Belgium, Göbel (2007) applied a multivariate duration model with unobserved 
heterogeneity. He finds that participation in subsidised employment significantly 
shortens the duration until entry into unsubsidised employment. Furthermore, it sig-
nificantly increases the duration of the first employment spell, but has no significant 
effects on the duration of later unemployment periods. Also for Belgium, Cockx et al. 
(1998) estimated duration models to analyse the effect of temporary wage subsidies 
on job tenure; they found positive, but insignificant effects. Similarly, Hamersma 
(2005) obtained insignificant effects of a subsidy on job tenure for the State of Wis-
consin, using statistical matching techniques.  IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  9 
Summing up, most studies find that taking up a subsidised job has positive effects 
on subsequent employment prospects of previous unemployed participants. How-
ever, some effects cannot be identified by the research designs underlying the stud-
ies mentioned above (Calmfors 1994). First, a deadweight loss occurs, if several of 
those subsidised would have been recruited also without help of a subsidy. The un-
derlying reason might be imperfect information on the side of the caseworker as well 
as collusion between the public employment office and the employer. Studies rely-
ing on a statistical matching approach might interpret the share of comparison group 
members that found a job without the help of a subsidy as an indicator for the size of 
deadweight losses. Second, substitution effects prevail, if some of those taking up a 
subsidised job will merely replace other workers. Third, displacement effects may 
arise if employment in some firms increases as a consequence of subsidisation, but 
at the expense of jobs in other firms, such that the only effect is displacement.  
Also as part of the German “Hartz-evaluation” Boockmann et al. (2007) analysed the 
effect of changes in the legislation on wage subsidies for elder workers on the em-
ployment prospects of this group, thus taking advantage of a “natural experiment”. 
They used a difference-in-differences estimator to compare changes in transition 
probabilities between the affected group and a comparison group comprised of 
slightly younger workers. The authors found nearly no significant effects and con-
cluded that deadweight effects – those subsidised would have been hired anyway – 
are a major problem of wage subsidies. However, only a comparatively small per-
centage of individuals in the analysed age groups actually received the subsidy. 
Moreover, underlying changes in legislation affected the maximum duration of the 
subsidy, whereas the actual mean duration of the subsidy decreased over time 
(Bernhard et al. 2007). 
3  Evaluation approach 
We are interested in the mean effect of taking up subsidised employment between 
February and April 2005 on the labour market outcomes of participants. To deter-
mine this effect we have to estimate the counterfactual outcomes of participants in 
the absence of a subsidy. Any attempt to estimate these counterfactuals has, how-
ever, to take into account that subsidised workers are not selected randomly from 
the group of unemployed persons. In the absence of an experimental design one 
usually strives to find a very similar group of non-participating individuals, whose 
outcomes can be interpreted as counterfactual outcomes of the group of participants 
(Rubin 1974, Heckman et al. 1999).  
We will sketch the underlying idea briefly: In month t+h after programme entry in t 
every person is assumed to have two potential labour market outcomes: Y1
t+h is the 
potential outcome if a person has taken up a subsidised job during February to April 
2005, while Y0
t+h is the potential outcome in the case of non-participation. Participa-
tion in the programme is indicated by D
t = 1, non-participation by D
t = 0. To estimate 
the mean effect of taking up subsidised employment on the labour market prospects 
of participants, we assume that the participation of a person in the programme does IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  10 
not affect the potential outcomes of any other person (Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption). The so called average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is given 
by the expected difference in an individual’s two potential outcomes in t+h: 
(1) ATT
t+h   = E[Y1
t+h – Y0
t+h | D
t = 1]  
   =  E[Y1
t+h | D
t = 1] – E[Y0
t+h | D
t = 1].  
The first term on the right-hand side E[Y1
t+h | D
t = 1] is just the mean of the observed 
outcomes of participants. However, to estimate potential outcomes of participants in 
the case of non-participation E[Y1
t+h | D
t = 0] we have to take into account that par-
ticipants have at least managed to get a subsidised job, which implies that they 
have probably better labour market prospects than the average unemployed person.  
Statistical matching techniques provide a solution for this problem that relies on the 
Conditional Independence Assumption (Rosenbaum/Rubin 1983). We assume that 
the outcome in the case of non-participation does not differ between participants 
and non-participants, when both groups are identical in regard of a number of ob-
servable characteristics, summarised in the vector X. This is formally expressed as 
Y0
t+h ⊥ D
t | X, where ⊥ denotes statistical independence. The assumption is satisfied 
if X contains all variables that jointly influence selection into the programme as well 
as post-programme outcomes. An estimator for (1) is then given by 
(2) ATT
t+h = EX{E[Y1
t+h | X, D
t = 1] – E[Y0
t+h | X, D
t = 0]| D
t = 1}. 
We are thus basing the choice of our comparison group on a comprehensive num-
ber of variables, which will be described in detail in Section 4. The estimate is valid, 
however, only if there are in fact non-participants with characteristics similar to those 
of participants; the treated have to be within “Common Support” of the comparison 
group (Heckman et al. 1999).  
An important topic is the choice of the classification window in time, which defines 
which unemployed persons are classified as non-participating in a labour market 
programme. Sianesi (2004) and Fredriksson/Johansson (2004) have pointed out 
that labour market programmes in Europe are ongoing and any unemployed is a 
potential participant at any point of time. Individuals may take up a subsidised job 
sooner or later provided they are still eligible. But the unemployed themselves or the 
caseworker may decide against taking part in the wage subsidy programme, be-
cause they expect or are expected to find an unsubsidised job soon. Thus selecting 
a comparison group of individuals who never participated in any programme would 
base selection on expected (successful) future outcomes, and matching conditional 
on observable individual characteristics might not suffice to remove selectivity. 
Stephan (2008) demonstrates empirically that evaluation results vary with the choice 
of the classification window. Following the majority of the European literature, we do 
not put any restrictions on the future of persons and define non-participation as not 
taking up subsidised employment between February and April 2005, but eventually 
at a later date. IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  11 
For the programme investigated, a argument against the matching approach may be 
that we observe not solely labour market outcomes after receiving a subsidy, but 
rather labour market outcomes of a subsidy in combination with a job offer (Jaeni-
chen/Stephan 2007): First, the fact that someone has been able to find at least a 
subsidised job, implies that – even conditioning on X – there might be still unob-
served individual heterogeneity between participating persons and non-participating 
comparison persons. This might capture, for instance, the motivation of unemployed 
individuals and the assessment of their skills by caseworkers and firms. However, 
unobserved heterogeneity will be strongly correlated with observed explaining vari-
ables, in particular an individual’s labour market history (Heckman et. al 1999). 
Since we have comprehensive information on previous employment histories of un-
employed persons as well as of their partners this should at least strongly alleviate 
the problem at hand. Furthermore, we conduct a Rosenbaum bounds analysis 
(Rosenbaum 2002) to estimate how strongly an unobserved variable would have to 
influence the assignment process to undermine the results of the matching analysis. 
Second, subsidised and unsubsidised jobs might be concentrated in different em-
ployer segments of the labour market. Since our data do not contain information on 
employer characteristics, the matching of workers to heterogeneous firms may in-
volve a selection bias (of unknown direction) regarding job quality.  
4  Data and applied method 
Data and variables 
Our empirical analysis uses rich administrative data of the German Public Employ-
ment Service. The Integrated Employment Biographies (Integrierte Erwerbsbiogra-
phien, IEB, versions 5.1/6.0) contain socio-demographic characteristics and individ-
ual daily information about employment history, receipt of benefits, job search his-
tory and participation on several programmes of active labour market policy. 
Hummel et al. (2005) and Jacobebbinghaus/Seth (2007) describe a sample of the 
database that is open for public use through the Research Data Centre of the Public 
Employment Service. Additional information about unemployment benefit II receipt 
and household structure are drawn from a history-file on means-tested benefit re-
ceipt (Leistungshistorik Grundsicherung, LHG, versions 2.0/3.0). Since the latter 
dataset provides household information, we were able to merge partner information 
to the individual employment biographies. We thus account not only for the individ-
ual employment history, but for the partner’s employment history, when modelling 
selection into subsidised employment. Furthermore, we merge the latest information 
on the employment status from data marts of the Statistic Department of the Federal 
Employment Service to compute our outcome variables, which are explained in 
more detail below.  
The potential treatment group consists of all persons who have been registered as 
unemployed covered by Social Code II on January 31, 2005, and whose subsidised 
employment started between February and April 2005. The potential comparison 
group members consist of a 19 percent sample of all unemployed persons covered IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  12 
by Social Code II on 31 January 2005. Both, treatment and comparison group are 
restricted to unemployed persons who receive unemployment benefit II, were not 
older than 57 years, did not participate in any active labour market programme on 
January 31 2005, and did not have missing data in basic socio-demographic charac-
teristics like age, sex, occupational qualification and migration background. As has 
already been mentioned, potential comparison group members may not take-up 
subsidised employment between February and April 2005, but eventually at a later 
date. Furthermore, from 2005 onwards, data sets from those 69 municipalities opt-
ing out of co-operation with the Public Employment Service (optierende Kommunen) 
have not been integrated in our databases yet. Thus we exclude districts, where 
only municipalities administer unemployment benefit II receipt from further analysis. 
Figure 1 
Entries into subsidisation covered by Social Code II between February and 













0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Women in West Germany
Men in West Germany
Women in East Germany
Men in East Germany
In percent
Up to 3 months 4 to 6 months 7 to 12 months More than 12 months
 
Source: Own calculations, based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statistics 
Department of the Federal Employment Agency, without municipalities opting out of co-operation with the 
Public Employment Service. 
 
We are convinced that a programme is not only characterised by its type, but also 
by its length. Figure 1 shows that around fifty percent of the subsidies in our sample 
are granted for four to six months and around thirty percent for up to three months. 
The share of long-term subsidies is somewhat higher in East Germany than in West 
Germany, probably because of weak labour market conditions in East Germany. 
Since our observation period is restricted to 20 months after programme entry, we 
restrict our analysis on wage subsidies of short-term duration (up to three month) 
and of medium-term duration (four to six months). 
Furthermore, separate analyses are conducted for four main groups, conducted of 
women and men in East Germany or West Germany. For our largest treatment 
group, men in West Germany, we present results also by age, occupational qualifi-IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  13 
cation, migration background and (for those older than 30) time since the end of the 
last regular job. We use the variables depicted in Overview 1 to model selection into 
the programme as well as post-programme outcomes.  
Our outcome variables are measured at the beginning of each month, up to the 20
th 
month after (hypothetical) programme entry. To compute outcome variables for 
comparison group members, it is necessary to assign them potential program start 
dates; we compute these as a random draw from the observed distribution of pro-
gramme start months of the treatment group. All outcomes are defined as success-
ful events, thus positive average treatment effects will indicate a positive impact of 
the wage subsidy. In particular, our outcome variables are: 
a) Unsubsidised regular employment that is subject to social insurance contribu-
tions, 
b) Not registered as unemployed and not participating in an active labour market 
programme, 





individual characteristics  Age, migration background, health restrictions, qualification. 
Individual labour market 
history during the last 
five years 
Duration of employment/unemployment/not observable states 
like out of labour force, participation in active labour market 
programmes, receipt of unemployment assistance during  
December 2004, characteristics on the last job (earnings, 
full/part time, job duration). 
Household characteris-
tics  Single/partner, children, partner’s qualification. 
Partner’s labour market 
history during the last 
five years 
Duration of employment/unemployment/not observable states 
like out of labour force, participation in active labour market 
programmes. 
Local labour market 
characteristics 
Unemployment rate in 1/2005 and its percentage change dur-
ing the preceding year, share of long-term unemployed in 
1/2005 and its percentage change during the preceding year, 
vacancy-unemployment ratio in 1/2005 and its percentage 
change during the preceding year, type of district (classification 
by Rüb/Werner 2007). 
Interaction effects  Individual labour market history by age, partner’s labour market 
history by age. 
 
Note that our evaluation approach implies that participants are sampled conditional 
on their unemployment exit, while the non-participants, by definition, are unem-
ployed at the beginning of the evaluation period (Jaenichen 2002). Therefore, when 
computing our outcome-variables a) and b), we do not interpret times of subsidised 
employment and the obligatory follow-up period of further employment already as a 
labour market success. Regarding outcome variable c), times of subsidised employ-
ment are subject to the usual social security contributions. Thus, subsidised em-
ployment will contribute to meet eligibility criteria for unemployment benefit I receipt. 
If a previously subsidised worker becomes unemployed and fulfils these criteria, he IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  14 
would avoid receiving unemployment benefit II receipt again. Unlike outcome vari-
able a) and b), which refer only to the individual level outcome, variable c) refers to 
the household level. Note that persons might even work in a subsidised job and re-
ceive unemployment benefit II at the same time, if earnings are not sufficiently high 
to support a large family. 
Table A.1 in the Appendix shows variable means of selected explanatory variables 
for subsidised workers as well as for our samples of potential comparison persons. 
Subsidised persons might be regarded to be a positive selection compared to all 
unemployed. In particular, younger unemployed persons, highly skilled unemployed, 
individuals without migration background and needy job-seekers who were em-
ployed last during 2004 are overrepresented among the participants. Thus there 
seems to be some cream skimming in the assignment of wage subsidies. 
Applied method 
Propensity-score matching is a useful simplification of matching on a high-dimen-
sional vector of X-variables. Rosenbaum/Rubin (1983) have shown that it is suffi-
cient to match on the propensity score Pr(X) = Pr(D
t = 1|X) to obtain the same prob-
ability distribution for treated and non-treated individuals. Thus, if (Y0
t+h,Y1
t+h ⊥ D




t) | Pr(X) will also be satisfied. Thus we estimate in a first step 
the propensity score for participants and non-participants by means of a probit 
model, with X as the vector of exogenous variables. The second step consists of a 
selection of a comparison group such that the distributions of the propensity scores 
are balanced for participants and controls. Estimates are performed using the stata-
module psmatch2 (Leuven/Sianesi 2003). 
For each group - for instance, West German women, who received a short-term 
subsidy - we estimate several probit models. We begin with the entire set of covari-
ates and select variable sets that enter the next estimation step: In the first step, a 
set of covariates is kept in the model, if a Wald-Test on the hypothesis that their 
parameters are jointly zero indicates that the variable set has a significant impact 
with α = 0.5. During further steps this threshold value is decreased down to α = 0.1. 
Propensity scores are then computed for the remaining group specific model by al-
ways accounting for socio-demographic characteristics independent on the results 
of the preceding test procedure. 
We apply six different matching algorithms to check for sensitivity of the outcomes: 
1) One-to-one nearest neighbour matching without replacement and caliper 0.001, 
2) one-to-one nearest neighbour matching with replacement and caliper 0.001, 3) 
one-to-two nearest neighbour matching with replacement and caliper 0.001, 4) one-
to-three nearest neighbour matching with replacement and caliper 0.001, 5) radius 
matching with caliper 0.001 as well as 6) radius matching with caliper 0.0005. Note 
that average treatment effects computed with different matching algorithms hardly 
differ from each other.  IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  15 
To test for the quality of matching, the mean standardised bias (MSB) (Rosenbaum/ 
Rubin 1983) between each treated group and its matched comparison group is 
computed across all variables in X. The standardised bias of a covariate is defined 
as the difference of means in the treated and matched control sample, divided by 
the square root of the average sample variance. Thus a lower value of the MSB in-
dicates more similarity between the two groups. In the following we will only present 
results for the procedures that generally obtain the smallest standardised bias 
(Rosenbaum/Rubin 1985). These are radius matching with caliper 0.001 for me-
dium-term subsidies and with caliper 0.0005 for short-term subsidies. The MSB after 
matching never rises above 2.1 percent (Figure 2). Moreover, also t-tests (not dis-
played here) show that the hypothesis on equality of means of the covariates cannot 
be rejected after matching. Hence, we achieve a good balancing of the distributions 
of the explaining variables across treatment and comparison group. 
Finally, one might argue that caseworkers and employers, who have to decide to 
grant a subsidy respectively to recruit a subsidised worker, will probably have addi-
tional information – not included in our dataset – about the job-seeker. This informa-
tion might have an impact on treatment probability and labour market outcomes, but 
is not included in the data set. We analyse therefore, how sensitive the estimated 
treatment effects are to a violation of the Conditional Independence Assumption. For 
this purpose we apply the stata module mhbounds (Becker/Caliendo 2007) – avail-
able for nearest neighbour matching without replacement – to compute the Mantel-
Haenszel statistics for the outcomes in each month after assignment.  
Table 2 
Rosenbaum-bounds analysis for the outcome variable “not unemployed and 
not participating in an active labour market programme”, 20 months after pro-
gramme entry 
   Short-term subsidy  Medium-term subsidy 
Men in East Germany  2.8  3.5 
Women in East Germany  5.0  3.6 
Men in West Germany  1.8  2.9 
Women in West Germany  2.2  2.7 
Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for up to 3 months, medium-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 
months. The Table displays the factor by which unobserved heterogeneity would have to influence selec-
tion into subsidised employment to undermine matching results. 
Source: Own calculations, based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statis-
tics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, without municipalities that opted out. 
 
Table 2 reports odd ratios for men and women in East and West Germany; it re-
stricts itself to the outcome variable “not unemployed and not participating in an ac-
tive labour market programme” and the 20th month after programme entry. The 
treatment effects of short-term subsidies up to three months are significantly differ-
ent from zero on a level of α = 0.05 for odd ratios between 1.8 and 5.0. For treat-
ment effects of medium-term subsidies between four and six months the odd ratios 
range from 2.9 to 3.6. The interpretation is, for instance, for a value of 1.8 that the 
results are insensitive to a bias that would nearly double the odds of treatment. 
Thus, we are confident that the results are robust with respect to a potential violation 
of the Conditional Independence Assumption. IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  16 
Figure 2 
Estimated average treatment effects of a subsidy on the labour market pros-
pects of needy job-seekers taking up a subsidised job 
Short-term subsidy (up to 3 months) 
379 treated / 58718 controls
Mean bias before matching: 18.1
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Months since start of treatment
Men in East Germany
234 treated / 48024 controls
Mean bias before matching: 18.8
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Months since start of treatment
Women in East Germany
 
 
698 treated / 89849 controls
Mean bias before matching: 14


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Men in West Germany
304 treated / 64270 controls
Mean bias before matching: 19.7


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Women in West Germany
 
 
Medium-term subsidy (4 to 6 months)  
732 treated / 60557 controls
Mean bias before matching: 15.1


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Men in East Germany
566 treated / 50535 controls
Mean bias before matching: 16.8


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Women in East Germany
1133 treated / 94411 controls
Mean bias before matching: 12.8


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Men in West Germany
412 treated / 69508 controls
Mean bias before matching: 19.8


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Women in West Germany
 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Sta-
tistics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, without municipalities opting out of co-operation 
with the Public Employment Service. 
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5  Empirical results 
Effects for the main groups 
Figure 2 displays in detail the evolution of the estimated average treatment effects 
over time. Plots above the abscissa have to be interpreted as a “success” of the 
wage subsidy. Remember that the period of subsidisation as well as the following 
period, during which the employer is obliged to sustain the employment relationship, 
are not interpreted as a “labour market success” when computing employment and 
unemployment outcomes. As can be seen clearly, treated persons were “locked-in” 
– as a necessary side-effect of the construction of the outcome variables – for the 
period of subsidisation and for the compulsory period of further employment. We 
find large and significant positive effects of the wage subsidy on the labour market 
prospects of participants immediately after the end of the follow-up period, which 
then decline slightly over time. In fact, the highest treatment effect of 63 percentage 
points is found for women in East Germany, seven months after the start of a short-
term subsidy.  
Our main empirical results – for month 20 after treatment start – are also summa-
rised in Table 3. It documents the labour market outcomes as share of treated and 
of matched comparison persons a) in regular employment, b) not unemployed (or in 
a labour market programme) and c) no longer receiving unemployment benefit II. 
Furthermore, the table displays average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) that 
are computed simply as the difference between labour market outcomes of treated 
and matched comparison groups. 
Table 3 
Treated individuals taking up a subsidised job during 2/2005 to 4/2005 and matched 
comparison persons: Labour market outcome and estimated average treatment ef-
fect on the treated (ATT) 20 months after start of the subsidised job 
     Short-term  subsidy  Medium-term subsidy 
     East  West  East  West 
      Men Wo. Men Wo. Men Wo. Men  Wo. 
Treated 0.64 0.69 0.62 0.66 0.68 0.67  0.63  0.67
Comparisons 0.31 0.23 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.23  0.29  0.26
a) in regular 
employment 
ATT 0.33 0.45 0.30 0.37 0.40 0.45  0.35  0.40
Treated 0.72 0.79 0.69 0.76 0.74 0.73  0.72  0.76
Comparisons 0.43 0.39 0.47 0.49 0.40 0.38  0.44  0.47
b) not unem-
ployed and not 
in programme  ATT 0.29 0.40 0.22 0.28 0.34 0.35  0.28  0.29
Treated 0.63 0.53 0.68 0.69 0.64 0.59  0.71  0.67







c) not receiving 
unemployment 
benefit II  ATT 0.35 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.36  0.37  0.35
Before 18.1 18.8 14.0 19.7 15.1 16.8  12.8  19.8 Mean standardised 
bias  After 0.8 1.7 0.6 1.4 0.9 1.4  0.8  2.1
All 381 236 699 304 735 568  1134  412 Observations of  
treated persons  In Support  379 234 698 304 732 566  1133  412
Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for up to 3 months, while medium-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 months. 
All estimated average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) are significant at α = 0.01. 
Source: Own calculations, based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statistics 
Department of the Federal Employment Agency, without municipalities opting out of co-operation with the 
Public Employment Service. 
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20 months after taking up the subsidised job, the share of participants in regular 
employment exceeds 60 percent in all treated groups. Furthermore, it is in most 
cases nearly 40 percentage points higher than in the comparison groups. While still 
more participants – more than 70 percent – are neither unemployed nor in any la-
bour market programme, the difference to comparison groups is obviously slightly 
smaller than looking at employment outcomes: A comparatively higher share of 
comparison persons than of treated persons withdraws from the labour market as 
discouraged workers. Finally, also more than 60 percent of the treated do not re-
ceive unemployment benefit II for needy job-seekers any longer; the average treat-
ment effect on the treated accounts for 35 percentage points. 
Comparisons of estimates between the groups investigated must be interpreted with 
caution, since characteristics of group members may differ for each group. Nonethe-
less we would like to draw attention to several aspects:  
First, labour market outcomes do not differ much between recipients of short- and 
medium-term wage subsidies. Thus, it seems that the duration of the subsidy is not 
necessarily a function of placement difficulties. Treatment effects are mostly higher 
within groups receiving a medium-term subsidy compared to those receiving a short-
term subsidy, if we look at the beginning of the observation period or at its end. 
However, if we concentrate at the expiration date of the follow-up period, short-term 
subsidies seems to be more effective than medium-term subsidies: In the first month 
after the follow-up period had expired (7
th month for short- and 13
th month for me-
dium-term subsidies since start of treatment), the effects for short-term subsidies 
are up to nine percentage points higher than for medium-term subsidies.  
Second, estimated treatment effects for the outcome variables “regular employed” 
and “not unemployed and not in a labour market programme” are in the majority of 
points in time slightly larger a) for female than for male workers and b) for East Ger-
many than for West Germany. The results are mainly due to varying labour market 
results of the unsubsidised comparison groups – women as well as unemployed 
workers in East Germany have in general worse labour market prospects than male 
and West German needy job-seekers.  
Third, Table 3 shows that the share of participating persons “not receiving unem-
ployment benefit II” 20 months after programme start is either higher or rather simi-
lar to the share in “regular employment”. Noticeable exceptions are women in East 
Germany, whose share in regular employment is considerably higher than the share 
for those not receiving benefits (8 percentage points for medium- and 15 for short-
term subsidies). This may be a hint that several of these women are working in low 
wage jobs and receive additional benefits to increase their household income.  
Note finally that the share of the comparison group that has taken-up unsubsidised 
employment – indicating which share of participants should (at least) have also 
found a job without the help of a subsidy - may be interpreted as deadweight losses IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  19 
of subsidisation. This implies that the deadweight accompanying wage subsidies for 
needy job-seekers would amount to at least 20 to 30 percentage points. 
Table 4 
Subgroups of treated West German men taking up a subsidised job during 
2/2005 to 4/2005 and matched comparison persons: Labour market outcome 
and estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 20 months after 






































































































































































































































































Short-term subsidy            
Treated 0.64 0.59 0.66 0.59 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.64
Comparisons 0.36 0.27 0.34 0.24 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.35
a) in regular 
employment 
ATT 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.29
Treated 0.67 0.69 0.75 0.66 0.68 0.74 0.68 0.71
Comparisons 0.50 0.41 0.47 0.39 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.50
b) not unem-
ployed and not 
in programme  ATT 0.17 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.21
Treated 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.58 0.61 0.73







c) not receiving 
unemployment 
benefit II  ATT 0.27 0.37 0.34 0.39 0.34 0.25 0.32 0.32
Before 16.16 16.15 15.51 16.23 16.33 17.23  16.61  16.30 Mean standardised 
bias (MSB)  After 0.65 0.89 0.63 1.04 0.69 1.50 1.06 0.60
All 299 313 248 173 553 146  262  453 Observations of  
treated persons  In Support  297 313 248 173 552 146  262  452
Medium-term subsidy          
Treated 0.65 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.61 0.57 0.68
Comparisons 0.34 0.24 0.32 0.22 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.32
a) in regular 
employment 
ATT 0.32 0.39 0.32 0.42 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.35
Treated 0.76 0.70 0.73 0.69 0.73 0.71 0.67 0.76
Comparisons 0.47 0.38 0.44 0.38 0.45 0.44 0.40 0.47
b) not unem-
ployed and not 
in programme  ATT 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.29
Treated 0.72 0.67 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.66 0.62 0.76







c) not receiving 
unemployment 
benefit II  ATT 0.36 0.39 0.34 0.43 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.38
Before 15.06 14.21 12.16 19.13 15.10 13.86  12.97  13.25 Mean standardised 
bias (MSB)  After 0.72 1.01 0.62 1.25 0.74 1.96 1.82 0.56
All 471 515 401 251 885 222  398  709 Observations of  
treated persons  In Support  471 514 400 251 885 222  398  709
Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for up to 3 months, medium-term subsidies for 4 to 6 months. All estimated 
average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) are significant at α = 0.01. 
Source: Own calculations, based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statistics 
Department of the Federal Employment Agency, without municipalities opting out of co-operation with the 
Public Employment Service. 
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Effects for subgroups of West German men 
Treatment effects might be heterogeneous for unemployed with different character-
istics. For male needy job-seekers in West Germany, our number of observations is 
sufficiently high to perform separate estimates across subgroups. The results are 
displayed in Table 4 and show that effects differ across groups.  
In particular, estimated treatment effects on subsidised persons are slightly larger 
•  for needy job-seekers between 35 and 49 than for those between 25 and 34 
years, 
•  for individuals without migration background than those with migration back-
ground, 
•  for unemployed persons with occupational qualification compared to those with-
out occupational qualification, 
•  for previously long-term (at least one year without a job) unemployed needy job-
seekers older than 30 than for those who were only short-term unemployed.  
Thus, it seems that the effectiveness of targeted wage subsidies has been higher for 
groups with particular placement difficulties. The underlying reason is probably that 
these groups have more problems to find a regular job without the help of a subsidy. 
This might be more easily achieved for persons without migration background, with 
occupational qualification and shorter unemployment duration. Subsidies might thus 
create an opportunity for hard-to-place individuals to disclose their potential produc-
tivity - which is a-priori supposed to be low - to an employer. 
Comparison with findings for the pre-reform period 
Does the effectiveness of wage subsidies differ between needy job-seekers in the 
post-reform period and the entire group of unemployed persons in the pre-reform 
period?  
Table 5 displays findings of ZEW et al. (2006), where several groups of individuals – 
consisting of unemployment benefit recipients as well as unemployment assistance 
recipients – taking up a subsidised job during the second quarter of 2002 were ana-
lysed. Results are shown for 20 months as well as 36 months after programme start.  
The effects of a subsidy on the subsequent employment rates of participants 20 
months after programme start are partly higher, partly lower across the investigated 
groups of needy job-seekers. However, the effects on rates “not unemployed or in a 
labour market programme” are in most groups investigated larger across recipients 
of unemployment benefit II than they were in the pre-reform period.  
That may be cautiously taken as a hint that wage subsidies are not less effective for 
recipients of basic social care than they were for former recipients of unemployment 
benefit or unemployment assistance. Note also that the cited study showed that es-
timated treatment effects decrease further between 20 and 36 months after taking 
up a subsidised job, but remain still significant at α = 0.05 at the end of the observa-
tion period. IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  21 
Table 5 
Treated individuals taking up a subsidised job during the second quarter of 2002 
and matched comparison persons: Labour market status and estimated average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 20 months and 36 months after start of the 
subsidised job 
         Short-term subsidy  Medium-term subsidy  Medium-term subsidy 
 
 
     training requirements  training requirements  for hard-to-place 
 
 
     East  West  East  West  East  West 
 
        Men Wo. Men Wo. Men Wo. Men Wo. Men Wo. Men Wo. 
20 months after programme start                            
Treated 0.62  0.62 0.65 0.69 0.70 0.73 0.62 0.71 0.54  0.62  0.50  0.62
Comparisons 0.40  0.28 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.23  0.15 0.21  0.21
a) in regular 
employment 
ATT 0.22  0.34 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.47 0.31 0.43 0.31  0.47  0.29  0.41
Treated 0.66  0.69 0.72 0.77 0.74 0.77 0.71 0.81 0.60  0.67  0.60  0.72








ployed and not 
in programme  ATT 0.13  0.30 0.24 0.20 0.28 0.37 0.22 0.23 0.24  0.39  0.19  0.22
36 months after programme start                                     
Treated 0.61  0.68 0.61 0.69 0.67 0.71 0.62 0.65 0.50  0.65  0.50  0.56
Comparisons 0.42  0.33 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.24  0.24 0.23  0.23
a) in regular 
employment 
ATT 0.19  0.35 0.26 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.28 0.33 0.26  0.42  0.27  0.34
Treated 0.67  0.74 0.71 0.79 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.80 0.60  0.72  0.62  0.73








ployed and not 
in programme  ATT 0.11  0.20 0.14 0.11 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.11 0.15  0.28  0.15  0.14
Observations 949  346 948 562 2462 1266 1106 1019 339  242  1269  597
Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for up to 3 months, while medium-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 months. 
All estimated average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) are significant at α = 0.05. 
Source: ZEW et al. (2006), Table A.4.4. 
 
6  Conclusions 
As we have noted in the introduction, it has not been obvious ex-ante that previous 
results on the effectiveness of wage subsidies would hold also for needy jobseekers 
receiving unemployment benefits II, a group that as such exists in Germany only 
since 2005. Our study present a first assessment of the effectiveness of wages sub-
sidies for this group, which now encompasses the majority of unemployed persons 
in Germany. 
Our results suggest that short and medium-term targeted wage subsidies improve 
the subsequent labour market prospects of needy job-seekers in Germany: 20 
months after taking up a subsidised job the share of treated persons in regular em-
ployment is around 40 percentage points higher than within comparison groups. The 
estimated effects on the shares not unemployed and the share not receiving basic 
social care any longer are slightly smaller. Groups with particular placement difficul-
ties benefit comparatively more from subsidisation. Furthermore, the results do not 
differ much from those obtained for participants from the entire group of unemployed 
persons during the pre-reform period. 
The positive findings are in line with international results on the effectiveness of 
wage subsidies. A Rosenbaum-bounds analysis suggests that our results are quite 
robust against hidden bias. In consequence, one might conclude that wage subsi-
dies are an effective means to improve the economic self-sufficiency of previously 
unemployed workers.  IAB-Discussion Paper 21/2008  22 
However, some caveats are in order: First, effectiveness of a programme on the 
individual level does not imply that the programme is also cost-efficient – the data 
contain, however, no individual information on the amount of the subsidy. Second, 
deadweight losses might be a serious problem – considerable shares of participat-
ing persons might have got the job also without subsidisation. Thus the allocation of 
subsidies has to be monitored carefully by the Public Employment Service and its 
caseworkers. Also incentive structures in the governance of the Public Employment 
Service have to be shaped in a way that collusion between caseworkers and firms 
can be ruled out. Third, our applied method does not identify potential displacement 
and substitution effects – subsidised persons will certainly substitute other workers. 
Nonetheless, this does not prevent overall effects for an economy might be positive 
(Calmfors 1994); but overall effects might only be identified on the macro level. 
Fourth, an arbitrarily expansion of the programme is prevented since wage subsi-
dies will only be granted if a firm is willing to recruit the unemployed person in ques-
tion and if the caseworker approves subsidisation because of individual placement 
restraints. Finally, groups with particular placement difficulties seem to benefit com-
paratively more from subsidisation. Thus an extension of the programme on other 
groups might decrease its effectiveness. 
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Variable means of selected attributes (0 = no, 1 = yes) in percent for potential comparison (PC) and treated (T) persons. 
   Short-term subsidy  Medium-term subsidy 
   East West East West 
   Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
   PC  T  PC  T  PC  T  PC  T PC T  PC  T  PC  T  PC T 
Age < 25  11 15 11 19 10 13 12  15 10 18 10 16 10 11 12 14 
Age 25-34  23 32 21 27 24 36 24  30 23 30 22 27 24 33 25 26 
Age 35-49  47 46 48 48 47 45 45  51 47 43 48 49 47 47 46 51 
Age 50-57  20 6 20 6 19 6 18  52 010 20 8 19 9 18 9 
Migration background  8 4 9 3 25 21 26  13 8 4 9 2 24 20 25 13 
Childless single  62 61 30 36 62 62 36  51 62 61 30 32 62 63 35 49 
Couple  9 8 10 8 5 5 7  59 11 10 7 5 5 77  
Lone parent  2 1 24 25 1 2 21  27 2 2 24 29 1 1 21 22 
Married   27 30 36 29 31 31 35  16 27 26 36 32 31 30 35 21 
Without qualification  13 3 13 2 22 12 28  41 3 3 13 2 22 12 27 6 
Lower secondary school  12 6 11 2 27 19 27  19 12 7 11 3 27 20 27 17 
Vocational training  29 28 20 10 29 41 19  29 29 25 20 12 30 37 20 30 
Higher secondary school   6 4 7 5 6 6 8  564 7 4 6 4 75  
with vocational training/higher education  40 60 48 81 16 21 18  43 40 60 48 79 16 27 19 42 
Last regular job 2004  24 42 28 42 23 35 26  40 24 35 28 45 22 37 26 38 
Last regular job 2002/2003  17 14 14 16 21 25 17  20 17 18 14 15 22 23 17 22 
Last regular job before 2002  37 9 38 10 34 7 34  93 712 38 12 35 13 34 13 


















































































Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for up to 3 months, while medium-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 months. 
Source: Based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statistics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, without municipalities opting out of  
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